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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred when it held that a subordination agreement,
which surrendered the statutory right of priority, was valid
notwithstanding the blanket prohibition in section 38-1-29.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 is unambiguous and prohibits a lien claimant

from varying rights provided under the statute by private agreement. The Lender
relies on dicta from a decision issued prior to the enactment of section 38-1-29 as
the sole support under Utah law for its position. See Richards v. Security Pac.
Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah 1993). Moreover, the Lender's position
necessarily elevates the rights of lenders over those of lien claimants, ignores key
language in the Richards opinion which is contrary to its argument, and ignores the
legislature's subsequent enactment of section 38-1-39.
In the opening brief, Olsen discussed the evolution of mechanics' liens and
how other states, including California, have addressed lien waiver provisions in the
statute. Olsen acknowledged the competing interests of lien claimants and lenders
and discussed how courts have attempted to address these competing positions.
Ultimately, given the lien statute's primary purpose of protecting lien claimants
and the legislature's enactment of section 38-1-39, Olsen argued that section 38-129, as it was previously situated, operated to void the Guaranty of Completion, and
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the trial court erred when it concluded that industry practices dictated that section
38-1-29 could not be construed to void the Guaranty.
The underlying theme of the Lender's brief and the trial court's ruling is
that subordination agreements cannot possibly violate section 38-1-29 because
such a situation would be unworkable and not afford lenders any protections. First,
the law governing the mechanics' lien statute and lien claimants is straightforward
and well-established in Utah: a[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanic's Lien
Act manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and
furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other
improvement. Lien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that
purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f 8, 162 P.3d 1099 (quoting Interiors
Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)). The
trial court's ruling failed to adhere to this policy when it upheld the Guaranty and
narrowly, rather than broadly as required, construed section 38-1-29 to allow the
use of subordination agreements.
Next, in discussing the use of subordination agreements, this Court in
Richards, the case on which the Lender so heavily relies, stated: "Given the
legislature's creation of a specific statutory preference for mechanic's lienholders,
if the question is framed as a choice between which party should receive a
windfall, we believe it should be the mechanic's lienholder." See Richards, 849
2

P.2d at 612. When a party, like the Lender in this case, receives the value of a lien
claimant's work without having paid for it, this Court's clear preference is to side
with the lien claimant who is attempting to recover the value of the work and
materials provided. See id. Although the Richards opinion does discuss the
possible use of subordination agreements, it was issued prior to the enactment of
section 38-1-29, and its discussion was limited in context. At the end of the day,
Richards expresses that the rights of lien claimants under the statute are to be
protected over those of a lender. As such, Richards does not support the Lender
over Olsen, nor does it support the trial court's ruling in this case.
Finally, the legislature endeavored to provide lenders with certain
protections and later provided an exception to section 38-1-29's blanket
prohibition when it enacted section 38-1-39. Nowhere in the Lender's brief is
section 38-1-39 discussed. The reason for the Lender's failure to discuss section
38-1-39 is simple: If the Lender's argument was correct, section 38-1-39 would be
unnecessary. Like California after the Bentz decision, the Utah Legislature
recognized a need to provide a statutory exception to blanket prohibition against
waiving or abrogating lien rights as set forth in section 38-1-29. In creating this
statutory exception, the legislature did not repeal section 38-1-29. Rather, the
legislature crafted a narrow exception that was tied to a guaranty of payment, not
completion, to the lien claimant and to statutorily required language informing the
3

lien claimant of the rights being compromised through the agreement. As
discussed in the opening brief, the Guaranty of Completion wholly fails to meet the
requirements set forth in section 38-1-39. The Guaranty of Completion was not
accompanied by payment, and the Guaranty was deceptively titled with pages of
boilerplate language requiring a lien claimant to waive all rights provided under
the statute.
The trial court erred when it held that section 38-1-29 allows for
subordination agreements. Section 38-1-29 prohibits a lien claiming from varying
rights under the statute through a private agreement. A subordination is
quintessential variation of the one of the most important statutory rights granted to
lien claimants—the right of priority. In 2006, the right of priority could not be
"varied by agreement," and more importantly, it could not be varied through a
three page document with a deceptive title as compared to the document's actual
effect.
II.

The trial court erred when it summarily concluded that the only
evidence in the record was not sufficient on this issue of fraudulent
inducement.
The only evidence in the record demonstrates the Lender's agent

misrepresented the terms and effect of the Guaranty of Completion in order to
induce Luke Watkins into signing the agreement. Once evidence is introduced to
indicate the Lender voluntarily undertook a duty to inform Maestro of the contents
4

and effect of the Guaranty of Completion, the rule that one party does not have an
obligation to assure that the other has a clear and accurate understanding of the
document is rendered moot. Utah law recognizes that once a party voluntarily
assumes a duty, which it may have had no obligation to assume, it must discharge
that duty fairly and competently. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mountain Logan Clinic,
LLC, 2008 UT 21, f 15, 182 P.3d 333; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, f26, 61
P.3d 1068.
The trial court erred when it ignored the only evidence in the record in
order to grant summary judgment to the Lender. The trial court failed to address
the long recognized the rule of law which provides "'that a person will be given
relief from fraud even though he failed to read the contract before signing if he was
by some act or artifice induced to refrain from reading it, or if because of the
circumstances he was justified in relying on the representations made.'" Berkeley
Bankfor Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) {quoting Johnson
v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945)); see also The Cantamar, LLC
v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ffi|20-24, 142 P.3d 140. Because this issue is
generally resolved by a jury, the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment and dismissed Olsen's lien claim.

5

III.

In addition to being fraudulently induced, the assignment clause in the
Guaranty fails by its express terms and for lack of consideration.
As set forth above, Maestro's signature on the Guaranty was fraudulently

obtained rendering its provisions invalid, but assuming the Guaranty was
enforceable, the assignment does not apply to this lien claim and would be
unenforceable due to a failure of consideration. The Lender's attempt to rely on
certain provisions within the Guaranty fails because the bank has not correctly
interpreted the terms of the selected provision, nor has it properly applied the
provisions to the claims in this action.
a. The express terms of the assignment render it inapplicable as a defense
to this lien claim.
The Lender erroneously contends the Guaranty assigned all of Maestro's
claims to the Lender. The alleged assignment provision follows the subordination
clause, and it states: "Guarantor does hereby assign to Lender all claims which it
may have or acquire against Borrower or against any assignee or trustee in
bankruptcy of Borrower; provided however, that such assignment shall be effective
only for purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan."
The express terms of the assignment provision renders the Lender's interpretation
and application of the assignment incorrect for two reasons. First, the assignment
only pertains to an assignment of a claim against the Borrower rather than the
collateral. Second, the assignment is only for purposes of bankruptcy or
6

insolvency of the Borrower and then it is "effective only for purposes of assuring
to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan."
i. The assignment only applies to Maestro's claims against the
Borrower.
The Guaranty defines the terms used in the document, and the assignment
does not include claims against the property. In the definitions portion of the
Guaranty, Borrower is defined as "Matt Hood." In addition, Collateral is
separately defined, and the definition of Collateral does not include the Borrower.
(R. at 283.) All portions of the subordination clause of the Guaranty, which
includes the purported assignment, require Maestro to subordinate and assign any
claims it has against the Borrower, Matt Hood. The subordination clause contains
no requirement that Maestro subordinate or assign its claims against the Collateral
or the property. The Lender attempts to interpret this assignment broadly to cover
any possible claim. The subordination and assignment, which the Lender drafted,
are narrowly tailored and do apply to Olsen's mechanics' lien against the property
because the property is not included in the definition of the "Borrower."
In this action, Olsen seeks to foreclose against the property through a
mechanics' lien. The Borrower, as defined in the Guaranty, is not a party to the
action. An action to foreclose against the property is an in rem proceeding. See,
e.g., Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99,ffi[9-l1, 22 P.3d 784 (judgment lien
against property survives in personam bankruptcy action); Blue Creek Land & Live
7

Stock Co., v. Kehrer et aL, 60 Utah 62, 206 P. 287, 289 (1922) (foreclosure action
is an action in rem). Accordingly, since the assignment provision contained in the
subordination clause only applies to a claim against the Borrower, it has no
application to an in rem claim asserted against the property. The assignment in the
Guaranty of Completion is not a defense available to the Lender in this action.
ii. The assignment only applies in a bankruptcy proceeding
and only then to ensure the Lender is paid what it is owed
under its loan to the Borrower.
The assignment is not as broad as the Lender would lead this Court to
believe. In quoting the assignment language, the Lender omits the preceding
sentence which provides the context for the assignment. The preceding sentence
provides: "In the event of insolvency and consequent liquidation of the assets of
Borrower, through bankruptcy, by an assignment for the benefit of creditors, by
voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets of Borrower applicable to the
payment of claims of both Lender and Guarantor shall be paid to Lender and shall
be first applied by Lender to the Loan." The quoted language relied on by the
Lender follows this provision. The assignment requires Maestro to assign any
claims against the Borrower, assignee, or trustee "in Bankruptcy of Borrower."
Accordingly, the assignment only applies in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding and requires Maestro to assign its claims to the Lender in order to
ensure the Lender is paid first in the bankruptcy action - i.e. a subordination clause
8

directly tied to bankruptcy. Accordingly, the assignment has no effect on the claim
in this case which are not against the Borrower and not asserted in the Borrower's
bankruptcy.
In addition, the Lender overlooks the provision in the assignment which
states: "provided however, that such assignment shall be effective only for
purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan." The
Lender makes no argument for how this provision could be read to allow the
assignment to be asserted as a defense to a foreclosure action against the property.
The assignment is limited to bankruptcy proceedings, and by its terms, is limited to
assure the Lender has priority to full payment in the bankruptcy action. The
assignment has no application to Olsen's claims in this matter.
b. Assuming the assignment was enforceable and covered the in rem claim
in this action, the Guaranty would be unenforceable due to failure of the
consideration.
In asserting the Guaranty provisions as a defense to the lien claim in this
action, the Lender has not described what consideration was provided in exchange
for the Guaranty. If Maestro was paid in full, the consideration would be the
payments secured by Maestro's consent to the Guaranty. Where Maestro's claim
is for money owed for its work, this action demonstrates that the consideration
failed. As such, the Guaranty provisions are not enforceable for failure of
consideration.
9

CONCLUSION
Utah law does not support the trial court's ruling that (1) a subordination
agreement is allowed under the 2006 version of the mechanic's lien statute, or (2) a
Lender's agent is entitled to misrepresent the terms and effect of a document with
impunity. Olsen respectfully requests this court to reverse the trial court and
remand for further proceedings.
DATED this

'

day of June, 2010.

RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

ZACHARY E. PETERSON
P^UI^P. BURGHARDT
Tfftorneysfor Appellant
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